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WARMING UP THE COOL PLACE:
KIERKEGAARD, WITTGENSTEIN AND D.Z. PHILLIPS
Anthony Rudd

This paper is a critical examination of D.Z.Phillips' supposedly
Wittgensteinean "contemplative" conception of philosophy, as he applies it to
religious issues, and in particular to his discussions of Kierkegaard. I argue that
this conception embodies an commitment to an ideal of neutrality which rests
on an unacceptable account of philosophy as aiming for a "view from
nowhere"; that Phillips fails to appreciate the full significance of Kierkegaard's
way of doing philosophical work; and that Kierkegaard has a valuable account
to offer of how philosophy can have a normative significance, even after the
demise of the foundationalist ambition to stand outside all language games.

There has been a good deal of discussion recently of the relation
between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. D.Z. Phillips has argued that they
are both anti-metaphysical thinkers, who reject the foundationalist project
of finding a validating basis for our practices which is external to those
practices. Both of them, according to Phillips, have an alternative conception of philosophy as conceptual clarification, an unravelling of confusions
which are generated by failing to distinguish one practice/languagegame/ form of life with another. However, Phillips also advocates - and in
this he claims, rightly or wrongly, to be following Wittgenstein - a further
conception of the role of philosophy, one that he calls "contemplative", and
which he does not think is present in Kierkegaard. In this paper, I want to
argue that this conception of philosophy (whether or not it is really
Wittgenstein's) is not tenable; that Phillips fails to appreciate the full significance of Kierkegaard's way of doing philosophical work; and that
Kierkegaard has a valuable account to offer of how philosophy can have a
normative significance, even after the demise of the foundationalist ambition to stand outside all language games.
I

Phillips begins his book, Philosophy's Cool Place' by telling a story which,
in one form or another, is by now a familiar one. Once upon a time, it was
thought that philosophy - metaphysics - was able to provide us with a
direct inSight into the nature of Reality as it is in itself. On the basis of this
insight, philosophy could then critically appraise all the other forms of discourse and practice that we engage in - all the varieties of science, religion,
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morality, politics and so forth - and decide which were legitimate by seeing
which ones really addressed or reflected the nature of Reality itself. But
now we have (or many of us have) lost confidence in this picture.
Philosophy has no direct inSight into the Real which enables it to playa
critical and foundational role for the rest of human culture. This raises the
question: what, if anything, can the role of philosophy be after the demise
of foundationalism? Phillips' answer is, firstly, that philosophy has the task
of unravelling conceptual confusions which arise when the "grammar" of
one language-game is misconstrued by analogy with that of another. But
beyond this, he urges philosophy to adopt a "contemplative" stance, one
that is rooted in a fundamental wonder that there is such a thing as discourse at all, that the language-games we play should even be possible.
This is supposed to avoid the errors of traditional foundationalism,
while also avoiding the neo-pragmatism or ironism recommended by
Rorty. For Rorty, once we have rejected the pretensions of traditional metaphysics, we are simply left with the particular language games, and no
absolute perspective from which they could be either validated or criticised. But Rorty takes it that conceptions such as "truth" or "reality" are
themselves metaphysical ones; the demise of fowldationalism doesn't just
mean that we should abandon the attempt to get an absolute perspective
on the language-games, but that we should abandon the idea that the language games themselves aim to get at the truth, that they aim to disclose
reality to us. (Unless these formulae themselves are reinterpreted in a very
blandly pragmatic sense.) So science, morality, religion etc are just ways of
coping; they don't aim at truth in any more exalted sense than that. Phillips
rejects this conception', pointing out quite rightly that Rorty himself
remains a kind of foundationalist; rather than accepting our languagegames for what they are, he reinterprets them in the light of his general
philosophical outlook (neo-pragmatism), and by so doing drains them of
any claims that they make to embody truth or goodness. In this way he
makes them compatible with a blandly tolerant attitude, but in so doing
fails to respect their specificity. Rorty's stance is not really neutral; he
imposes his own anti-realist outlook on the practices he describes.
Phillips, by contrast, purportedly following Wittgenstein (this is not the
place to enquire into whether or not he has Wittgenstein right) recognises
that there are practices, language-games or what have you, that do make
strong claims about what is true or good or right, and that the making of
these claims is essential to the practices themselves. However, he does not
think that it is any business of philosophy to adjudicate between conflicting beliefs. From its "cool place" it contemplates the various languagegames without making normative judgments about them, though it still
recognises their right to make such judgments about one another. This
does not, Phillips argues, mean that philosophers "cannot be critical of any
religious practice"; there are occasions on which "philosophical reflection
reveals confusion in religious practices."2 If practices themselves are confused, then a perspicuous description of them will reveal that confusion.
But one can only demonstrate such confusion by reference to other (unconfused) practices, which means that we cannot coherently suppose all our
practices to be confused. 3 Philosophy cannot pass judgement on practices
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from a standpoint external to them. It notes the differences, it umavels the
concephlal confusions that arise when one language-game is construed in
terms appropriate to another, and beyond that it engages in the (slightly
mysterious) practice of wondering at the possibility of there being discourse at all. (This concern for conditions of possibility might suggest a
Kantian transcendental inquiry into the necessary preconditions of language-games, but it is clear that Phillips has nothing like this in mind.)
In what follows, 1 want to contrast this conception of philosophy's role
with Kierkegaard's philosophical practice. I will argue, firstly, that, in criticising certain important claims that are made by Kierkegaard, Phillips
abandons his own "official" conception of philosophy and becomes open
to a form of the same objection that he himself brought against Rorty.
Secondly, 1 will argue that Kierkegaard shows us how, without reverting
to foundationalism, philosophy can playa critical, as opposed to a merely
contemplative role, that it can be used to assess, rather than simply to
describe certain language-games.
II

Phillips' demand for philosophical neutrality is apparently intended to
let the various language-games be themselves. But it still continues, if in a
rather enfeebled and shadowy form, the foundationalist tradition. Phillips
demands that the philosopher, qua philosopher, abstain from any judgements as to the rightness or wrongness of particular language-games, but
he does not deny that the philosopher qua participant in some particular
language-game has the right to make judgements about the goodness of
one practice compared to another. So a Catholic may, qua Catholic,
denounce Satanism as evil. But if the Catholic is also a philosopher, then
speaking philosophically s/he can only note that Catholics say and do
these things, Satanists say and do those ones, that they do not appreciate
one another ... and then engage in contemplative wonder at the existence of
these varied forms of discourse. This amounts to asking the person who
has strong commitments of any kind to become a split personality when
s/he becomes a philosopher:
The assumption underlying this ideal of neutrality is that 1 can rise above
my commitments - even those which are most fundamental to me as a person, those which go to constitute my sense of identity. As a philosopher, I
can stand above the conflicts which engage my passions as a participant,
and simply contemplate them. The old metaphYSical ambition to step outside our own skins, to enjoy the view from nowhere, is thus continued in
Phillips' work. It is an enfeebled version of the traditional ambition,
because, for Phillips, although the philosopher can stand outside all of the
particular language-games, that perspective makes available no standards
by which to criticise or evaluate anything s I he sees from that vantage point.
There is a point of view external to our particular practices which we can
adopt, but it is not a normative one. It seems, nonetheless, that this claim
would still be exposed to many of the criticisms that have been brought
against the "view from nowhere" conception. In particular, Kierkegaard
would have seen it as dangerously "demoralising" to suppose that we
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could set our deepest, identity-conferring commitments to one side while
engaging in philosophical contemplation. s However, although Phillips'
"official" position is a neutral one, he himself seems unable to resist givin.g
philosophy a more critical role. Not only is he committed to something like
a "view from nowhere", it also turns out that he claims the right, from that
perspective, to criticise and revise our particular language-games.
In a discussion of Kierkegaard's Purity of Heart, Phillips objects to
Kierkegaard's claim that those who do not will the Good are necessarily
double-minded. Kierkegaard says that even those who are apparently
committed whole-heatedly to evil or selfish aims still harbour an ineradicable longing for the Good, and thus remain internally divided. Phillips comments that "This seems to be sheer stipulation on Kierkegaard's part"6 and
he goes on to point out that there are people who seem to have no longing
for the Good at all, who are entirely happy in their depraved ways.
Phillips' overall thesis is that, although Kierkegaard gives many persuasive
examples and diagnoses of inner division in Purity of Heart, he is mistaken
to claim that it is a universal condition for those who do not sincerely will
the Good; this claim is an illicit generalisation which fails to be sensitive to
the existence of counter-examples.
I think this criticism misses the point of what Kierkegaard is doing. He
does not make his claims on the basis of empirical investigations. He does
not present evidence to show that he has investigated a large sample of
depraved characters, and found none who escape a longing for the Good.
Nor does he claim that the depraved would always admit, even to themselves, that it is the Good they are longing for. When he asserts that "[j]ust
as a person, despite all his defiance, does not have the power to tear himself away completely from the good ... he also does not even have the power
to will it completely"7, this is, in an important sense, an a priori claim. It is
fundamental to Kierkegaard's religious convictions (and surely to mainstream Christianity in general) that we are created with an inclination to
the Good, and that in turning against the Good we are turning against our
own natures. In Purity of Heart, Kierkegaard is writing, not as an empirical
psychologist, but as a religiously committed individual, presenting an
"upbuilding discourse" for the edification of other such individuals. The
assumption that there is in us, however much we may want to deny it, a
longing for the Good is a basic assumption which goes to constitute the
kind of language-game that Kierkegaard is playing here. By denying - on
essentially empiricist grounds - that Kierkegaard is entitled to such an
assumption, Phillips is doing precisely what he is supposed not to be doing
by his own lights - dismissing a language-game that is in fact played,
because it does not conform to his philosophical presuppositions.
Can Phillips be defended against this criticism? By his own standards,
he is entitled to criticise a religious practice or belief only if the description
of it shows it to be confused by reference to other practices. Jamie Ferreira,
building on Phillips' work, has developed a clearer account of how this
might work - of how a descriptive philosophy can have a normative force than I can find in Phillips' own writings. She points out that for
Wittgenstein "[dlescription is not simply empirical generalisation" but an
attempt to give a perspicuous account of "the norms generated in prac-
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tice."S So description isn't just a random cataloguing of facts; rather
"Wittgenstein sees himself to be describing the common structure informing religious aspirations."9 If a descriptive philosophy could make clear the
nature of the basic norms characterising a religious form of life, then it
could also make clear the confusions of a purported believer whose words
or actions contradicted "a norm to which all religious believers hold."10 In
this way philosophy could have a critical, normative role without having
to impose its own standards on practices from the outside.
Ferreira's account has its problems. The claim that there is a "common
structure" of norms that all religious believers would hold to might seem
to involve a dubious essentialism. In fact Ferreira insists that "[t]his common structure is not a matter of essence, but rather a grasp of a family
resemblance commonality ... "11 But it seems highly unlikely that the sort of
"a posteriori" investigation that Ferreira has in mind could come up with a
set of norms "to which all religious believers hold". A "family resemblance" account will typically be one that finds lots of criss-crossing similarities and differences, but no essential features that all family members
share. 12 One might reply that we needn't be so ambitious - we might perhaps succeed in finding norms that a smaller but still substantial group
share - perhaps all Catholics. And so a Catholic who could be shown to be,
without recognising the fact, departing from those norms, would be
revealed as confused. The real issue, then, turns out to be self-contradiction. It would not by itself have any normative significance to point out
that someone's beliefs differed from those of some other (or even most
other) believers - unless the first person had a commitment to accepting
what the others believedY Philosophy's critical function, then, is to point
out contradictions between the norms believers implicitly accept and either
the things they explicitly say, or the beliefs that are implicit in other things
that they do. However, such contradictions, once realised, could be
resolved in either of two ways - by rejecting the norms or by rejecting the
beliefs that conflict with them. Philosophy is only concerned with the fact
that there is a contradiction - it has, on Ferreira's account, nothing to say
about how to resolve it. So only a very minimal normativity is involvedno more than one can get out of the law of non-contradiction.
Can Ferreira's account be used to defend Phillips' critique of
Kierkegaard?" To do so, one would have to show that Kierkegaard's statements about our longing for the Good stood in contradiction to the implicit
norms of the (religious? Christian? Protestant? Pietist?) form of life which
he himself accepted. But, of course, Phillips shows no such thing. His
objection to Kierkegaard's claims is not that they conflict with the "deep
grammar" of religious existence, but that they conflict with a collection of
empirical data about the conscious psychological states of depraved people. (And as it is part of Kierkegaard's claim that such people suffer from
self-deception, it is begging the question to think that he can be refuted by
simply citing their testimony.) As for the norms that are central to the kind
of Christianity to which Kierkegaard adhered, and which it would embarrass him to come into conflict with; as I suggested above, his claims seem
to be very much in harmony with them. Kierkegaard is in fact attempting
to spell out explicitly what is implicit in a way of life that seeks to treat all

Faith and Philosophy

132

people - even the most depraved - as children of God, capable, however
corrupted by sin, of mrning back to Him. So Kierkegaard is doing what
Ferreira thinks a philosopher should - making explicit the norms implicit
in a form of life. But Kierkegaard is doing so from within that form, and
having done so, he is using those norms to give an account of aspects of
human life outside the religious sphere. And this account is not an "empirical generalisation", but a perspicuous representation of modes of human
activity and self-deception - perspicuous, of course, from the standpoint of
the religious form of life in which he shares.
Phillips certainly appears to be criticising and rejecting, on philosophical
grounds, a crucial thesis that Kierkegaard is asserting on first-order religious grounds. For Phillips, philosophical descriptions can have a critical
force if they make perspicuous confusions that acmally exist in the religious discourse. But we haven't yet seen any good reasons to think that
Kierkegaard is confused in this way. And the only other way in which
Phillips' criticism could be justified on his own terms would be if he could
show that the thesis he is criticising was not in fact a first-order religious
one (confused or otherwise), but a philosophical doctrine which
Kierkegaard was superimposing on his religious discourse. If Kierkegaard
was illicitly moving from legitimate religious exhortation into confused
philosophy, then he would be opening himself to proper philosophical criticism. But in order to make out this case,15 Phillips would have to make the
- highly implausible - claim that one can neatly sort out what is "philosophy" and what is "religion" in a work like Purity of Heart. 1hAnd it would, of
course, be philosophy that would be doing the sorting out. So the philosopher, once again, would stand in judgment over the particular languagegames, insisting on the right to tell them what they may legitimately say or
not say, and rejecting those elements of them that s/he finds philosophically disreputable. Kierkegaard's claim about the double-mindedness of those
who fail to fully will the Good is a basic part of his religious outlook; for
the philosophical overseers to reject it on the ground that it is really an illicit piece of philosophising would radically alter the namre of the languagegames that religious people would be allowed by them to play.

III
In this section I want to consider another attempt by a would-be
Wittgensteinean philosopher to show that claims like those that Phillips
objects to in Purity of Heart are indeed confused; and to show this without
abandoning a stance of philosophical neutrality. Michael Weston, following James Conant and Stephen Mulhall, has argued for an interpretation of
Kiekegaard's Postscript which sees it as a parody, one that sets up philosophical arguments which are in contradiction to the "grammatical"
reminders that he thinks are contained in the earlier part of the workY
Those reminders have to do with the essentially first-personal namre of
thinking about the meaning of life. Weston thinks that Johannes Climacus,
the pseudonymous author of the Postscript, having presented these
reminders, is then set up by Kierkegaard to develop an argument that we
can only find meaning in our lives "through a relation to the eternal"18 and
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that means that we must move from the aesthetic, to the ethical, to the religious and finally to the Christian way of life in order to fully establish such
a relation. Weston then objects, in very much Phillips' manner:
How can we say that [an aesthete] 'really' desired a meaning for her
life as a whole which is contradicted by what, when she reflects on
her life, she is content with? .. [W]hat Climacus is proposing is that
we know a priori that any such life is self-deceived. lhat is to objectify
the notion of the meaning of life. It is to forget ... that there is no general question of the meaning of life to which there could be a general
answer.l9
Unlike Phillips, Weston does not take himself to be criticising
Kierkegaard here; he assumes that this is precisely the point that
Kierkegaard is intending us to see by showing us Climacus' blundering.
(But the fact that Climacus' assumptions here are clearly identical with
those expressed by Kierkegaard under his own name in Purity of Heart
seems by itself to be a fairly decisive argument - not that others are lacking
- for rejecting this interpretation.) So on Weston's view, there is a contradiction between Climacus' insistence that questions about the meaning of
life have to be investigated from a first-personal perspective, and his equally passionate insistence that there is something universal about the answer
to such questions; that for everyone it applies, that we can only ultimately
find meaning by relating to "the eternal." So Climacus - and any believers
who suppose that they have a universally valid answer to the question of
the meaning of life - have mistaken the grammar of their own languagegame, are contravening (other) norms that they implicitly accept.
Weston's claim that there is a contradiction here seems to me to be
reveal a serious misunderstanding of Climacus' (and Kierkegaard's) insistence on the first personal character of existential thinking. Climacus (and
Kierkegaard) certainly insist that I have to discover for myself that my life
can only become meaningful through a relation to Cod; but for
Kierkegaard (as well as for Climacus) it is axiomatic that there is a universal human nature, that we were all created on the same terms. 2U But if so,
then it is true for anyone that his or her life can only become ultimately
meaningful through a relation to Cod - though what this will mean for
each individual's life remains a matter for that individual to discover.
Augustine exclaimed to Cod that "you have made us for yourself and our
heart is restless until it rests in yoU."2l As the Confessions amply demonstrates, it took deeply first-personal experience to bring Augustine to that
conclusion, but the conclusion is about the relation of humanity in general
to Cod. 22 In finding a contradiction here, Weston is confusing an epistemological claim that a universal truth can only be apprehended through one's
subjectivity, with a metaphysical (or "grammatical") claim that there is no
universal truth in existential matters.
But in any case, even if there was a contradiction here, why should it be
resolved, as Weston demands, by rejecting the belief in universal validity
rather than the insistence on the first-personal stance? Is it because the latter is more deeply embedded in religious practice? I think it would be very
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hard to show, just from a neutral, descriptive survey of practices, that that
actually is the case. Or is it because some mysterious insight into "grammar" reveals that one belief is connected to the Platonic essence of "the
notion of the meaning of life" while the other is not? Weston would scarcely want to say that. But he does make, from what is supposed to be a neutral philosophical position, highly controversial claims about what that
notion involves. (That there can't be a general question of the meaning of
life is a claim supposedly derived from insight into the notion of the meaning of life, which itself looks suspiciously general.) Such claims cannot
plausibly be derived from a purely descriptive survey of practices.
However he does it, Weston is apparently insisting on the right to decide,
ex cathedra, what is properly religious and what isn't. Once again, we see an
apparently humble conception of philosophy turning out to conceal a
remarkably ambitious, not to say imperialistic vision of the role of philosophy vis a vis the rest of culture.
IV

So it is not only Phillips who falls into confusions about neutrality while
trying to interpret Kierkegaard. But it is also not only in criticising
Kierkegaard that Phillips contravenes his own proclaimed neutrality.
Elsewhere too he claims the right to reject, on philosophical grounds, views
that are central to religious forms of life. The most striking example is his
treatment of the concepts of immortality and eternal life. He argues, on
philosophical grounds, that we cannot take these beliefs literally. To suppose that I will continue to exist as a self-conscious subject after my physical demise - whether as a disembodied soul or as a resurrected body - is,
according to Phillips, philosophically incoherent. 23 But, as a simple matter
of empirical fact, such beliefs do playa large part in most if not all religious
traditions. Once again, Phillips is claiming the right, on the basis of a supposed superior philosophical knowledge, to dismiss beliefs that are central
to the religious lives of many people. There is no Wittgensteinean modesty
here, no refusal to advance positive philosophical doctrines; Phillips seems
quite clear that philosophy is able to prove that people are psycho-physical
unities, and not potentially immortal souls temporarily inhabiting bodies.
But that rejected belief is not just a bit of remote philosophical theorizing; it
is central to various religious traditions and to the deepest hopes and fears
of their adherents.
It is significant, though, that Phillips considers the belief in personal
immortality is not just philosophically confused, but also irreligious, in that
it represents a selfish concern for personal survival, rather than a properly
religious concern for the transcendence of such selfishness. And he doesn't
simply reject all talk of eternal life. In Death and Immortality he interprets it
as referring to an attitude which we may adopt to our lives here and now,
one in which we see them under "the aspect of eternity."24 In more recent
work his position seems less straightforward, and indeed he explicitly criticises some "attitudinal" accounts. 2' But he continues to repudiate any idea
of a "temporal immortality" and to insist that the only genuinely religious
outlook is one which has abandoned any concern for personal survival.
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Now Phillips does not try to claim, as a descriptive psychologist or sociologist, that religious believers do in fact just mean what he thinks they ought
to mean when they talk of eternal life; such a claim would be quite obviously false as an empirical observation. 26 What he is saying, rather, is that
the beliefs of some religious people are not really religious at all, but rather
superstitious - where superstitions are self-serving fantasies which may be
demonstrably false on philosophical, or perhaps on scientific grounds. 27
And other people may be genuinely religious, but still fall into confusions
when they try to articulate the understanding that they are nonetheless
able to manifest in their lives. 28
Now Phillips is quite entitled to argue, as a participant in a religious
form of life, for an interpretation of traditional language about immortality
along non-realist, attitudinal lines. 29 This would be a controversial claim
made within a religious context. But he also apparently wants to claim, as a
philosopher and not just as a believer, that this interpretation is the only
genuinely religious one; and this claim is presented as a "neutral" philosophical insight into the "grammar" of religious belief. But here again we
see Phillips, as the philosopher surveying forms of life from the height of his
cool place, claiming the right to decide what is "really" religious, and what
is merely superstitious. By contrast, Miguel de Unamuno places the longing
for a thoroughly "literal" immortality at the heart of what religion is: "The
longing for the immortality of the soul, for the permanence in some form or
another of our personal and individual consciousness, is as much of the
essence of religion as the longing that there might be a God. The one does
not exist apart from the other, the reason being that fundamentally they are
one and the same thing."30 Who is right? The answer, surely, is that the
question can only be asked within a religious context, where it becomes the
question, "What should I believe?" (Unamuno is well aware of this; his is an
explicitly existential philosophiSing, which makes no claim to neutrality.)
But to ask outside any such context, from a neutral "cool place", whether
the belief in personal immortality is really religious or superstitious, is a
futile exercise. Where, asks Unamuno, "does religion end and superstition
begin, or perhaps rather shall we say, at what point does superstition merge
into religion? What is the criterion by which we discriminate between
them?"" There is no philosophical answer to this question, because there is
no "essence" (definable by "grammar" or otherwise) of "religion" (or even
e.g. of Christianity) which is accessible to a neutral investigation. To
describe a belief or practice as "superstitious" is to repudiate it, to take a
stand against it, and it is therefore at least implicitly to affirm one's own
commitments. It is not a piece of neutral conceptual elucidation.
Phillips however, has attempted to meet Unamuno's challenge by providing neutrally applicable criteria for distinguishing between religion and
superstition. Superstitions, he claims, are "blunders, mistakes, regarding
causal connections of a kind."32 Later he amended this claim: superstitions
are not just blunders but confusions, where a confusion is a (causal) belief
that couldn't possibly have been true. He gives the example of someone
who tries to injure an enemy by sticking pins in a picture of the person. It
isn't that this might have worked but in fact doesn't - rather "[w]e have
not the slightest idea of what it could mean to say that sticking pins in the
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picture could harm someone else."33 He later adds that "the superstitious
character of a practice will show itself in the character of the expectations
which surround it and in the tension between these and our common
understanding of causality."34 So a boxer who crosses himself before a
match is superstitious if he thinks it will protect him from injury; he may
be religious if he does so as a way of dedicating his performance to God. 3s
It seems then that for Phillips a belief is superstitious if it expects God or
supernatural agencies to bring about any physical changes in the world;
religious if it is concerned with the attitude we adopt to the world. This
understanding is characteristic of a certain kind of modern religious
thought, which responds to the rise of science by abandoning belief in the
miraculous, leaving science to explain why anything happens, and interpreting religion as having to do purely with an inward transformation of
our attitude towards the world. 36 That this understanding of religion should
be widespread in modernity is not surprising, but Phillips is taking a view
characteristic of one kind of (modern, liberal) religion and making it the
defining (universal, ahistorical) essence of religion (as distinguished from
superstition) in general. A purely descriptive account, by contrast, would
note that the distinction between "religion" and "superstition" has been
made in many different ways in different religious traditions and that these
distinctions do not simply coincide with one another, or with the one that
Phillips makes between the physical-causal and the spiritual-attitudinal.
Of course one could make Phillips' distinction, and one could as a matter
of stipulation say that the elements distinguished are to be called "religion"
and "superstition". But would this distinction, if made philosophically,
from "the cool place" and so without endorsing the correctness of any particular religious beliefs, have any normative force? Phillips thinks that a
neutral description can show superstitious beliefs to be confused. If we continue to follow Ferreira's account of how this works, the confusion would
be some sort of contradiction between such beliefs and others that the
superstitious person is also committed to. These could be religious beliefs
(in Phillips' high-minded quasi-Stoic sense, where they are sharply distinguished from any attempt to gain personal benefits) and/ or scientific or
common sense beliefs about causality. But we need to ask whether there
really are contradictions here. A "superstitious" belief in causal factors
beyond those recognised by science needn't contradict anything that science
does recognise, though it would contradict a scientistic philosophical claim
that science can explain everything. And while there may be a tension
between high-minded "religious" concerns for transcending selfish desires,
and "superstitious" desires for practical benefits, it isn't clear that there is
any formal contradiction between them. Why shouldn't the boxer cross
himself for both protection and dedication? And, furthermore, even if there
were contradictions, we again need to ask how philosophy (on Phillips'
view of it) can tell us how to resolve such contradictions. If my superstitious
beliefs do contradict my religious or my scientific beliefs, why shouldn't I
resolve the contradiction by rejecting the latter rather than the former? A
purely descriptive philosophy cannot assert the correctness of the norms
implicit in any practice/form of life; but this means that it cannot have any
normative force that goes beyond the mere demand for logical consistency.
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This is not to say that we should not distinguish between religion and
superstition, or even that we should not do so along the lines Phillips suggests; but we should recognise that such a distinction is not a neutral one.
Wittgenstein says "Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One
of them results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is a trusting."" But I see no reason why we should have to take that as a philosophical remark in Phillips' sense of "philosophical". It is an expression (significantly, written as a private note, not as part of a philosophical work) of
Wittgenstein's own normative commitments.
So Phillips' discussions of immortality seem to go against his proclaimed neutrality in two ways. Firstly, by arguing that the non-realist
interpretation of immortality is the only one that the established results of
enquiry in the philosophy of mind leave open to religious believers,
Phillips takes philosophy to be advancing definite theses, which then constrain the possibilities open to other forms of discourse. 38 And secondly, he
argues, as a philosopher and not simply as a believer, that his interpretation of concepts such as "eternal life" is the only genuinely religious one.
By doing so, he makes it look as though the constraints imposed by a
sound philosophy of mind don't in fact take anything away from what is
genuinely religious. But these (allegedly neutral, philosophical) claims
about what is really religious could only make sense if the philosopher
had, in some quasi-Platonic way, an access to essences which enabled him
or her to make authoritative judgments about what is and is not, truly religious. And such an access could not be provided by the purely descriptive
philosophy that Phillips endorses.

v
It seems then that would-be Wittgensteinean philosophers find it hard
to maintain their own "official" attitude of neutrality, departing from it by
making judgments about particular language games from a position which
is purportedly external to them all. Kierkegaard, I want to suggest, has an
altogether clearer sense of what philosophy can and cannot do. He allows
that philosophiSing can be critical, that it can have a normative edge; but
he denies that it can exercise that normative function from an external
standpoint.
Kierkegaard is concerned with different "spheres of existence" or
"stages of life" - aesthetic, ethical and religious (as well as various intermediate stages and sub-divisions.)39 But how can we decide what is the best
way to live? Kierkegaard rejects the metaphysical project which would aim
to validate or invalidate these ways of life by seeing whether they were
based on an accurate apprehension of Reality as it shows itself to the neutral, purely objective gaze of the philosopher (e.g. by seeing whether one
could prove the existence of "objective" moral standards, or of God). So he
attacks the confusions of "pure thought" - the attempt to stand outside any
particular sphere of existence, in order to judge them all from some neutral
ground. 4o And he is also, as Phillips notes, concerned to clear up conceptual
confusions which arise from failing to distinguish clearly between the
spheres. (e.g. confusing a religious acceptance of the authority of an apostle
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with aesthetic admiration for the achievements of a genius.") However,
Kierkegaard does attempt to do something more than this philosophically;
he tries to show us how we can make normative judgments as to the relative value of the different spheres of existence. How, though, can he do this
if there is no neutral perspective from which the various ways of life can be
compared with Reality in itself?
The lack of such an external perspective means that such normative judgments must be made from within one or other sphere. Hence
Kierkegaard's judgments about the different stages of life are made from
within the religious, and ultimately the Christian sphere. This might seem
to raise problems of incommensurability. A Christian may condemn aestheticism from Christian premises, but this will cut no ice with the aesthete.
This is why Kierkegaard resorts to indirect communication. That one cannot adopt a universal standpoint, does not mean that one is hermetically
sealed into a single outlook; hence Kierkegaard's creation of pseudonymous authors to express and explore from within the various stages of life.
In doing this, Kierkegaard is trying to clarify what it means to live aesthetically or ethically, or religiously and to note the differences between these
ways of life. By a good description one can, for instance, make clear to
muddled aesthetes that they are not really Christians. Phillips thinks that
this is philosophically legitimate; but for him philosophy cannot go beyond
this to show aesthetes that they ought not to be aesthetes. One practice may
criticise another, but philosophy can only note that there are these conflicts;
it cannot say that any substantive view is better than another. (Though
Phillips would accept that it is religiously legitimate for the Christian to
condemn aestheticism, or to preach to the aesthete.)
But Kierkegaard isn't just (qua philosopher) noticing differences, nor is
he just (qua religious author) preaching to the aesthete in terms that are
incommensurable with the aesthete's own. He is philosophising on the
basis of his own ethico-religious convictions, but in a way that is meant to
address those who do not share those convictions. The point is to show the
aesthete that aestheticism is unsatisfactory, and to show that from the
inside. How, though, can this be possible, if the different stages of life disagree precisely about what constitutes a good reason?42 Kierkegaard's reply
is that rational argument between the different spheres is possible, not
because there is any neutral point of view from which they can all be compared, but because all the stages (except perhaps lower forms of aestheticism) have a common concern - they are all parts of a wider existential language game. That is, they all share a concern with how a human being
should live. This shared concern enables one to develop a critique of one
stage from another, by showing that it does not enable the self to live a full
and satisfactory life, even though that common concern does not exist as
another sphere distinct from all the particular ones.
Kierkegaard believes, as I have noted above, that there is a common
human nature which demands a certain way of life from us; we are all
aware of it, but are inclined to repress that knowledge. It is this belief that
is the basic presupposition of his account of the stages of life. Those living
at the aesthetic, at the merely ethical, or indeed the merely religious (religiousness A) level are involved in repressing that self-knowledge; there-
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fore they suffer from the frustration and internal division that he diagnoses
in Purity of Heart. The diagnosis can only be made plausible to those who
do not start by sharing Kierkegaard's assumptions, by providing phenomenologies of the different ways of life which aim to show them as involving
existential aporias and crises which cannot be resolved in their own terms.
These problems can be experienced within the "lower" spheres, but they
can only be understood in terms derived from the "higher" ones. Hence
the rationality of the move, for instance, from the aesthetic to the ethical;
the latter offers the possibility of articulating the sense of dissatisfaction
which can be experienced while attempting to live a purely aesthetic life,
but which cannot adequately be understood in terms of the categories
which the aesthetic has available (boredom, bad luck etc.)43
But there is an obvious objection to this account - for the account of the
self on which Kierkegaard relies is a part of his wider ethico-religious view
of the world. The different spheres may all share a common concern for the
well-being of the Self, but they give very different accounts of it. So how
can Kierkegaard presuppose his view of the Self while addressing those
who do not share it? The simple answer is, because he thinks it's true.
Kierkegaard argues from within existence. And that means that he does
not aspire to Phillips' impossible neutrality. For him the appropriate place
to consider ethical and religious conflicts is from the position within those
conflicts that one thinks is the true one. The criterion he relies on for making judgments of relative worth between existential stances is the nature of
the Self. But his account of that criterion is itself not a neutral one - an aesthete, a non-religious ethicist and a non-Christian religious believer will
give different accounts of the nature of the Self. But this does not mean that
there can be no rational debate between the different spheres. It does mean
that the debate will take the form of a hermeneutic exercise, rather than a
foundationalist attempt to show that the superiority of one way of life can
be demonstrated from a point that is external to all of them. Instead, the
participant in sphere X will try to show those who live in other spheres
that it is in terms of a sphere X understanding of human life that they can
make most sense of their own lives; in particular someone in sphere Y
would have to be shown that sphere X has the resources to adequately
understand the problems of which s fhe may be more or less consciously
aware in sphere Y, and offer a plausible alternative. Further, one might
attempt to show that those who adhere to a sphere Y understanding do so
precisely in order to hide from themselves the (perhaps challenging or disturbing) truths that are understood in sphere X. This hermeneutics of suspicion is of course central to Marx's, Freud's and Nietzsche's criticisms of
religious and (some) ethical beliefs. But it is also a crucial part of
Kierkegaard's critique of non-religious outlooks. 44
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works are attempts to develop this
hermeneutical argument; he is successful to the extent that e.g. an aesthete
can recognise him or herself in Kierkegaard's fictional exemplars of the aesthetic life and, in so doing, be brought to recognise the shortCOmings of that
way of life. Alternatively, an aesthete may be motivated to respond by setting out a rival vision of the aesthetic,45 and perhaps to present fictional or
pseudonymous ethico-religious characters, with the aim of bringing ethical
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and religious believers to see themselves in a different light. The question
being disputed here is whether the conflicts and differences between the
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious are themselves best understood in
aesthetic, ethical or religious terms. This debate certainly cannot be settled
by appealing to a neutral point situated beyond it, but it does not follow
from that that it cannot be a rational debate (unless one takes a very narrow
Enlightenment/ foundationalist view of what reason is). Nor does it follow
that such a debate would have to be considered a non-philosophical one
(unless one stipulates a similarly narrow definition of what philosophy is).
And finally, contra Phillips, I can also see no reason to suppose that philosophy could find a way to adequately describe and thus contemplate, such a
conflict in terms which were neutral as between the conflicting parties. 46
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